Indo-Pacific and the Emerging Maritime Geopolitics: Contending Sino-Indian Strategic Interests

The much chanted 21st century as an Asian century has been largely dependent upon the effective and practical collaboration amongst the two Asian Giants-China and India. However, due to their overlapping strategic interests, the elements of confrontation amongst the two rising giants of Asia are more apparent than those of cooperation. It is in this backdrop that both the powers recurrently act contrary to each other. Accordingly, the vast Indo-Pacific region has become an epicenter of Sino-India maritime rivalry with China's rising influence and India's growing strategic presence in the region. Given China's strategic engagements in India's backyard, New Delhi's geostrategic interests in the Indo-Pacific are at stake. China has enhanced its military and other commercial activities along the sea lines of communication in the IOR mostly to constrain India's strategic maneuvering. As China's "String of Pearls" strategy and the "Maritime Silk Route" initiative have been intended to encircle India and thereby restrict its strategic outreach in the IOR, it is, therefore, obvious for India to boost its collaboration with other major powers, especially with the US to counter the Chinese strategic designs. Through this study, a sincere effort has been made to analyze the evolving maritime geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific region amid Sino-India competition and contention for the acquisition of maritime preponderance. Further, the study also focuses on India's counteractive measures against China's maritime maneuvers and naval tactics.

Introduction
The world politics has undergone strategic shifts in the post-9/11 era. 9/11 has changed the geostrategic landscape of Asia. While talking about the geostrategic shifts, the maritime security domain has become host to most vital changes. The strategic focus in the maritime arena has witnessed a shift from Pacific-Atlantic to the Pacific-Indian Ocean. A wide array of factors are responsible for this shift and the most significant among which is China's rising clout accompanied by more assertive territorial claims and India's rising economic and strategic posture as well as the mounting significance of the Indian Ocean. These developments have led to the transformation in foreign policies or in other words shift in policy focus of the external powers especially the US towards the region. Consequently, a new concept of 'Indo-Pacific' has emerged in the global politics of the current century.

In the 21st century Asia, the emergence of Indo-Pacific as an area of interdependence and cooperation traversing the Indian and Pacific Oceans and its attendant impact on the world order has captured the policy focus of political leaders of many countries. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was the first leader to talk about the vision of a 'broader Asia'. The Indo-Pacific is a complex of sea regions and littorals characterized by diverse cultures, religions, ethnicities, government structures, and economic models. The most common link that binds the diverse subsystems within this strategically significant Indo-Pacific region is the sea. The ocean plays a crucial role in the development of the countries of Indo-Pacific by providing them with rich maritime resources and facilities for intra-regional economic and cultural ties. Subsequently, the robust cultural and commercial ties led to the creation of strategically vital sea lines of communication.

As the Indo-Pacific comprises nearly half of the world's population, the region is acting as the largest market. The leading and the rising economic powers of the world like Australia, China, Japan, India, Indonesia, and Korea, are the main constituents of this integrated space. It is in this backdrop that the busy sea lanes of the region through which the maritime trade is flowing stood at the center stage in ensuring economic prosperity in the sub-region and beyond.

With the rising geostrategic significance of the Indo-Pacific region, the area has become an amalgam of converging and competing/diverging interests which can be clearly seen from the global power shift toward the region.¹ The maritime powers such as the US, China, India, Japan, Australia, are the key actors in the Indo-Pacific region. Among these powers, the rising maritime powers China and India, and the US-the world's most dominant resident maritime power-stood at the center of any development in the Indo-Pacific region. As these powers seek dominance and influence over one another with the aim of securing their respective strategic interests, they largely decide the pivot of the Indo-Pacific region in their respective contexts.²

Beijing, New Delhi, and Washington are seen as the pivotal powers in the world's strategically vital maritime expanse. The Indo-Pacific has become an area of competition and cooperation accompanied by the converging and diverging interests among these three core maritime powers. The strategic ties between New Delhi and Beijing in the maritime domain are being viewed on the basis of a mixture of convergent, cooperative and competitive relationships. Although there is intense economic interdependence, commerce and maritime trade among India, China and the US, the security competition for ensuring their respective dominance in the integrated space has become inevitable.³ All the three powers are engaged in efforts of balancing and counterbalancing each other and the competition is intense between China and India on the one side and China and the US on the other. Washington and New Delhi enjoy converging interests and cooperation than their respective cooperation with Beijing in this strategically vital Indo-Pacific region. The efforts of balancing and counterbalancing are evident from their respective policies, like China's 'string of pearls' and the new 'maritime silk route', India's 'Look East' now 'Act East' policy and the US 'Asia Pivot' policy. India, in particular, is looking at China's engagement in its strategic backyard with great concern and is, therefore, tilting towards the US and Japan, also having their own issues with China's rising clout in the region. India is doing this to overcome the menace it perceives from the dragon.

Geostrategic Significance of Indo-Pacific
Emerging as a geostrategic and geoeconomic concept, the Indo-Pacific region has been receiving rising importance in the field of international relations domain more importantly in defense and security scenario. The geostrategic significance of the region is evident from the fact of its geographical connotation covering the area from Eastern Coast of Africa through the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific Ocean. Owing to its geostrategic location, the concept of Indo-Pacific has gained wider acceptance throughout the geopolitical circles.

As the Indo-Pacific hosts the geostrategically crucial sea lanes, significant for the world's most dynamic economies, the region has become a major theatre for the intense geostrategic competition as well as cooperation between established and emerging powers. While speaking along these lines, Nicholas Spykman has seen Indo-Pacific region as the 'circumferential maritime highway that links the whole area together in terms of sea power.' Apart from this, the significance of the Indo-Pacific region lies in its being the center of gravity for the world's strategic and economic interests. Being the world's most dynamic region economically, the Indo-Pacific region is home to rich resources and can help in boosting several developed and developing economies. The integrated space comprises many of the world's strategically vital choke points for international commerce. The most significant among which is the Malacca Straits, through which near about a quarter of global trade passes. The Strait of Malacca is also seen as the most critical vein of the world economy.⁴

While speaking about the rising significance of the Indo-Pacific region, Ranjan has mentioned the following:

First, there is a number of competing economic interests and changing security perspectives of regional as well as extra-regional powers that have acted as a catalyst for the formulation of the idea of "Indo-Pacific" region. Second, the growing economic and military power of China has unsettled the regional countries prompting them to encourage other powers to engage in the region. Third, there is a growing acknowledgment of the importance of the seas in the Asian economic resurgence, reflected in the burgeoning demand for living and non-living resources, growing maritime trade, boundary disputes, and rising tensions. Fourth, an attempt is being made to move away from the narrow cartographic imaginations of the Indian and the Pacific Oceans and bridge the two through the concept of "confluence of the seas" in which Asia is the center of gravity of global political, economic and security dynamics. Fifth, in the context of shifting global economic growth potential to Asia, it is germane that a larger Indo-Pacific regionalism involving IOR-ARC, APEC and Pacific Islands Forum and other such organizations appear to be a key imperative in the promotion of free trade and economic cooperation among the stakeholders in the region.⁵

The mounting significance of this region is also apparent in the strategic equations of the major powers in the maritime domain. The more important among these strategic equations are Japan's 'Confluence of the Two Seas', the US' 'Asia Pivot/Rebalancing strategy' and China's new 'Maritime Silk Road' and India's 'Act East' policy, all aiming at playing a most active role in this vital region. All this has made the Indo-Pacific center of the current century's geopolitics.⁶

China and India in Indo-Pacific

China has been a rising economic power with a well-organized military capability. China has remained critical to the US existence and collaboration with many influential Indo-Pacific members. China stood for maintaining peace and stability in its vicinity and, hence, the foremost aim of China is to avoid armed conflicts so as to focus mainly on economic and diplomatic regional engagements. China has been claiming the entirety of South China Sea (SCS) region given its huge volume of natural resources and vitality for the sustenance of China's rapid economic growth.⁷ Since China has been leading in the manufacturing sector, it needs huge markets in the Indo-Pacific for its finished products. As China is a staunch supporter of regional economic integration, it desires Indo-Pacific region to remain free from any kind of militarization. The recent enhanced maritime actions by various regional and extra regional powers in the Indo-Pacific have led China to intensify its maneuvers in the region.

India has been considered as the main player in the Indo-Pacific affairs because of its huge economic and strategic potential as well as global diplomatic repute. India being a peace loving country, New Delhi favors a peaceful regional environment as a prerequisite for bringing regional economic integration. The rising economy of India needs resources that Indo-Pacific region, primarily ASEAN states, could provide. The SCS has been geoeconomically vital to India as more than 55% of country's maritime trade passes through the Strait of Malacca.⁸ Therefore, SCS serves as a nerve to India's maritime trade and, thus, for its safer movement, New Delhi has collaborated with the US, Japan, Australia South Korea, ASEAN and other active Indo-Pacific members.⁹ India has also found the region effective to fulfill its rising domestic energy demand. In this connection, both India and Vietnam have agreed upon various energy agreements to explore natural resources in the vicinity of SCS.¹⁰ Further, Vietnam has also extended oil exploration license to India's ONGC Videsh Limited up to June 15, 2017. In fact, India owns multifaceted interests in the Indo-Pacific region; however, China's aggressive attitude across SCS territory poses significant challenges to New Delhi's policy approach towards the Indo-Pacific region. Therefore, to secure its various geostrategic interests in the Indo-Pacific, New Delhi has moved closer to the US and other substantial players in the Indo-Pacific.¹¹ Subsequently, the move has created a situation of power dynamics in the entire Indo-Pacific region, wherein the military race for dominance amongst major players has led to the rising maritime geopolitical matrix.

South China Sea: A New Region of Evolving Indo-Pacific Geopolitical Matrix
In the recent times, the most debatable maritime issue at the global level has been obviously none other than the SCS dispute. As part of the Pacific Ocean, the strategically vital SCS covering an area of 3,500,000 sq km stretches between Karimata and Malacca Straits to the Strait of Taiwan. The SCS is surrounded by China from the South, Vietnam from East, the Philippines from West and Natuna Islands from the North. The SCS contains nearly 250 small islands, reefs, shoals, and sandbars.¹² The SCS has turned into a flash point given the major power rivalry primarily between the US and the main competitor of the zone, China. Although the SCS is endowed with abundant natural resources, its strategic prominence lies in its geographical position. The SCS has been a rich source of oil, a major fishing spot, and pivot to global maritime trade worth $5.3 tn.¹³ As per one estimation by the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), there are approximately 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves lying in SCS territory.¹⁴ Moreover, the region has been of pivotal significance so far as the global maritime trade is concerned.

The age-old maritime security issue of SCS has become a critical global issue only after the demand for suing naval rights that arose in the year 2009. However, the dispute is said to be an attribute of San Francisco Treaty (1951)¹⁵ wherein the larger portion of the SCS was surrendered by Japan after its defeat in World War II. China has been considering itself as the main contender by claiming almost 80% territory of the SCS, a move that has not only agonized the other equally vital stakeholders but also the extra regional powers like the US. Since China has time and again dared the US in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in the SCS, in reprisal, Washington has publicized the issue at the global level.¹⁶ In this way, the US has played significantly to turn the SCS issue into a global one. The rulings by various global tribunals vis-a-vis SCS dispute have been often overruled by China. In this regard, China has recently declined the ruling in favor of Philippines by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) on July 12, 2016. Apart from China's supremacy in SCS, the other five claimants, viz., Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam, have been also claiming their prerogatives, a move which has complicated the situation further.¹⁷ In fact, the SCS dispute has become a global maritime dispute, given the enduring Sino-US diplomatic and strategic hostility in the region. The US has been providing full support and backing to other five claimants of SCS against China's strategic rise in the region.

Both Taiwan and China have drawn U-shaped lines, better known as Nine-Dash line, to make their respective claims over a major portion of the sea across the areas of Spratly, Paracel, Pratas, and Macclesfield Islands. China provides historical backing to its claims particularly, the Nine-Dash line. In this regard, China has issued a map showing two islands, Paracels, and the Spratly's completely falling in its territory that was entirely opposed by Taiwan. There has been a mutual consensus amongst the global scholars and analysts, that Nine-Dash Line forms the main area of dispute in the SCS. Besides Nine-Dash line, there are several other areas of dispute involving two or more pretenders in the territory of SCS.¹⁸ By claiming over 21 and 8 islands respectively, both Vietnam and Philippines have stepped into the race through documental proof as well as geographical proximity and for such purpose, both the claimants have deployed military forces on the "Floating Islands".

Sometimes referred to as the silent claimant of SCS, Brunei has not been militarily active in the region and has been claiming Louisa Reef, a part of the Spratly Islands which has been already claimed by China and Vietnam too. Energy, fishing, and shipping form the main interests of Brunei across the SCS territory. Malaysia, the other contender of the dispute has been claiming a portion to the North of Borneo which also falls in the Spratly islands. Both Brunei and Malaysia are considered as the latest entrants in the evolving maritime geopolitics over the SCS to claim their areas which fall in their respective Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ's) as has been defined by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).¹⁹ Therefore, here it can be rightly said that China has completely dominated the SCS territory, whereas the claims made by other five main claimants have been left high and dry. Therefore, the changing regional security architecture has captured global attention as a few extra regional powers have directly got involved in the dispute.

China's current leadership under Xi Jinping has been enthusiastic to see the People's Liberation Army (PLA) well equipped with modern military vessels to win battles especially in the near seas (SCS).²⁰ Accordingly, China has made strong military bases and artificial islands across the territory of SCS, a move being constantly opposed by the US and other stakeholders of the sea. The US, along with its allies like Japan, India, Australia, Vietnam, and the UK, has been actively engaged to secure their own maritime interests as well as to support their respective cliques in the region. The US has been supporting the Philippines in its conflict with China, given the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty. The US has also been excessively concerned over the Sino-Vietnam conflict over oil exploration and seismic surveys in the SCS. Alternatively, China claimed that more than 66 countries, including Tajikistan, Taiwan, Togo, Myanmar, Niger, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Sri Lanka, Liberia, Cambodia, South Africa and others, have been supporting its claims over SCS. The US, on the other hand, enjoys considerable support from France, Canada, Germany, the UK, India, Japan, Australia, Italy, Vietnam, and others to counter China's rising strategic maneuvers in the SCS.²¹ Therefore, the US encourages all the claimants and other stakeholders of SCS to conform their maritime rights to international law and in this regard assures them full diplomatic support.

In brief, the SCS dispute has no longer remained confined to Indo-Pacific region only, rather has gained significant global focus. The Sino-US tussle over the maritime claims and Washington's diplomatic and strategic support to various claimants as well as other stakeholders has created a power balancing situation in the Indo-Pacific region. Hence, any strategic move by China receives equally challenging response from the US, thereby giving rise to the beginning of a new geopolitical great game in the entire region. Both China and the US have been claiming a substantial backing from various states to act against each other through various moves and countermoves. Against this backdrop, the geostrategic interests of the major regional powers like India vis-a-vis Indo-Pacific region have been at stake given the rising maritime geopolitics.

Evolving Sino-India Maritime Contention in the Indo-Pacific
India's geostrategic engagements in the Indo-Pacific have been to protect its economic and strategic interests in the entire Indo-Pacific primarily in the Southeast and East Asian regions. Accordingly, India has been gaining strong backing from the US, Japan, Australia, South Korea and other substantial Indo-Pacific member countries. During Prime Minister Narender Modi's visit to the US, Washington described New Delhi as an important partner in its policy towards SCS dispute. A joint statement, which for the first time mentioned SCS dispute, was given in which much concern was voiced over the increasing maritime tensions and thus jointly focused on enhancing marine safety.²² During Prime Ministerial level meeting between India and Japan in December 2015, both raised mutual concerns vis-a-vis SCS dispute. In this regard, one joint statement was issued wherein both the countries exhorted China "to show the utmost respect for the UNCLOS".²³ During Tony Abbot's visit to India in 2014, both Australia and India had agreed to make the Indo-Pacific region peaceful and prosperous. Further, the maritime security issues in the Indo-Pacific region were also highlighted during Prime Minister Narender Modi's visit to Australia (November 16-18, 2016).²⁴ During the 14th India-ASEAN Summit, India had asked the ASEAN states to be part of the SCS dispute and to follow international law including the 1982 UNCLOS. The ASEAN countries acknowledged and recognized the greater role played by India in the region to bring about cooperation and ensure security of the maritime trade along the SCS region.²⁵

India has been sharing more converging interests with these active major powers in the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, India and other claimant states and stakeholders of SCS have been also sharing mutual concerns vis-a-vis China's hard stand on the dispute. In fact, New Delhi has renewed its Indo-Pacific policy to reach out to regional as well as extra regional countries, from which it could seek support for maintaining peace and stability primarily across the SCS territory.²⁶ Hence, most of the global analysts and strategists are of the opinion that India's rising maneuvers across the SCS and in turn China's extended strategic outreach in the Indian Ocean Region have been considered as inimical to each other's security.

China has raised serious concerns about India's rising maneuvers in the SCS. Vietnam has recently concluded various energy agreements with India to work jointly in the oil exploration project within 200 nautical miles of EEZ in SCS. Earlier, the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC-Videsh)²⁷ was involved in oil exploration in the region and, in this regard, it has received two years extension for the same. These moves have been strongly criticized by China which has been posing a direct challenge to India's economic intentions in the region.²⁸ Furthermore, China, through the numerous statements, has cautioned India to stay away from SCS dispute. As part of China's aggressive policy, Indian vessels have been alarmed by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) since 2012. Therefore, Indian Navy has been maintaining a close vigil on the China's submarine movements across the SCS and Indian Ocean Region.²⁹

The 'string of pearls' policy by China to encircle India has forced the latter to enter into Malabar Exercises-an interactive trilateral naval exercises involving the US, Japan, and India in the Western Pacific. However, India has been reluctant to take any military stand and, therefore, has chosen the modus operandi of supporting security and strategic cooperation with the US but not at the cost of a dispute with China.³⁰ In fact, the SCS holds a significant place as far as the economic interactions amongst India and Indo-Pacific are concerned. Since, the SCS dispute in the coming years is likely to enter into a global military clash, where regional as well as extra-regional powers will be engaged to counter each other by favoring their respective allies. The chances of spillover are imminent that will affect India's economic interests. Against this background, India has been worried about the SCS dispute and therefore continues to have the closest surveillance over the recent developments in the region. Hence, peace and stability is a prerequisite to accomplish an economic dream in the region and, therefore, the security concerns would potentially affect India's strategic and economic ambitions in the region. Moreover, the rising economic growth of India would be also significantly halted.³¹ It is in this backdrop that India has been favoring a peaceful and long-lasting solution to all the regional conflicts in general and SCS dispute in particular.

Undoubtedly, China's claim over 80% of the SCS has been effectively challenged by the PCA. However, China's complete refusal to accept the decision has worried not only claimant states but non-claimants as well. As for as India's options in the verdict are concerned, it would lead towards the furtherance of its relations with the ASEAN, the US, Japan, Australia and other significant players active in the region. Along with India, the ruling was hailed by Japan, the US, Australia, ASEAN and other vital Indo-Pacific players.³² Keeping in view the vitality of the ruling, India's Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) has issued a statement that all parties should respect the judgment. Elaborating further the MEA statement, The Indian Express (July 13, 2016)³³ mentioned that "India supports freedom of navigation and over-flight and unimpeded commerce, based on principles of international law as reflected notably in UNCLOS." Further, the MEA also clarifies, "India believes that the concerned states should resolve disputes through peaceful means without threat or use of force and exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that could complicate or escalate disputes affecting peace and stability".³⁴

The SCS dispute, therefore, figures at the top of India's foreign policy objectives towards the Indo-Pacific region. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has been diplomatically insightful enough to get engaged with not only regional players but also with extra regional powers as well to protect country's vast geostrategic interests in the Indo-Pacific region. However, China has been sternly criticizing the growing military profile of India in the region. China is also agonized with the escalating India-US comprehensive bilateralism and effective collaboration in all the vital facets of the economy. China has been strategically aggressive with the US in the entire Indo-Pacific and, hence, has been often reiterating that it will not accept a new maritime power (India) in the SCS.³⁵ The Sino-India maritime rivalry across the SCS has also added fuel to the continuing border disputes between the two Asian super powers. For quite some time, it looked as if the recent Sino-India armed standoff near the border of Bhutan (Doklam) would lead to another war between China and India but both the sides were successful in controlling the situation peacefully. In fact, China is opposing India's extra tilt towards the US, Japan, and other active powers, and, therefore, has been openly daring New Delhi to stay away from SCS dispute. However, India on the other hand, while protecting more than half of its maritime trade as well as other strategic and diplomatic interests, has decided to join hands with these like-minded countries in the region.

China and India share more diverging interests and, in this regard, the Indo-Pacific region has turned into a new arena of mutual rivalry. No doubt China has welcomed India's initiative of installing Tsunami early warning system across the SCS territory, yet, the recent Modi-Trump hug was viewed with more suspicion by Beijing. During the recent Modi-Trump meeting, both Washington and New Delhi focused upon the freedom of navigation within the SCS. China, on the other hand, blamed both the US and India of destabilizing peace in the region and, therefore, asked both the parties to ensure peace and stability in SCS.³⁶ At present, the Sino-US rising geostrategic competition has turned the entire Indo-Pacific region into a new battleground of power contention. Under such scenario, being a rising power, India owns plentiful of geostrategic interests in the region and, hence, for their procurement, has jumped on the bandwagon.³⁷ To be brief, many analysts are of the opinion that China's tactics would decide Asia's future as all the states desire to have productive economic engagement with China; however, none wants Dragon's regional hegemony. No doubt, the much chanted Asian century depends largely upon Sino-India multifaceted and multilateral cooperation. Therefore, if the SCS and other maritime disputes are not settled peacefully, the region will experience enhanced militarization and arms race instead of economic prosperity.

Conclusion
The maritime security threats have become a cause of concern for most of the nations across the globe and the Indo-Pacific region has no longer remained free from these apprehensions. The SCS dispute has six claimant states indulging in a maritime war so as to accomplish their entitlement. The dispute has no longer remained confined to the concerned region only, rather it has developed into a global one with the entry of multiple extra regional players, more importantly the US. The reason for this is the geoeconomic salience of Indo-Pacific, as about 60% of oil and petroleum and 70% of container trade passes through the several straits of the region.

The SCS region is not only energy-rich; rather its geostrategic imperativeness has obligated India to get actively engaged in the region so as to secure its multilateral interests. With India's renewed 'Act East' and prolific tilt towards the US, the Indo-Pacific rebalancing strategy has entered a new arena. Ensuring maritime security and freedom of navigation especially in the Indo-Pacific region forms the core of India's Indo-Pacific approach. The Indo-US defense and strategic collaboration along with the support from ASEAN, Japan, Australia, and South Korea have been perceived with suspicion by China as an attempt to encircle it. Hence, under the new power balancing environment, China, attempts to oust all extra regional players from SCS territory, and towards this end, it has been openly daring India to remain at bay. India, on the other hand, has extended its maritime existence by signing several security agreements with various countries, especially the South East Asian countries. Therefore, the SCS dispute has become a new battleground for Sino-India rivalry. In reality, SCS dispute could become a crossroad for either realizing India's Indo-Pacific ambition and economic prosperity or regional disparity through enhanced regional militarization.

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Reference # 55J-2018-07-01-01